![]() Similarly, despite operations by the PDF and EAOs, a decisive victory to defeat the Burmese military is also improbable in the foreseeable future. With the continuation of bloody violence during the civil war, the PDF and EAOs are gaining ground in the peripheries of the country, and it is unlikely that the Burmese military can eradicate these groups despite their repeated campaigns against the insurgency. ![]() And most observers would agree that the territories under PDF control are in less-populated rural and jungle regions, while the Burmese military still firmly holds the population centers, including cities and urban areas. Accurate assessment of the control of territory is extremely difficult given the highly volatile battlefield situation and the constant contest for territory between the military and the resistance. In terms of territory, some estimate that the PDF and EAOs control 40 to 50% of the country’s territory. After all, the Burmese military has the luxury of collecting tax and purchasing weapons from China and Russia, while the PDF and EAOs must rely on underground channels to acquire arms. The resistance’s lack of income - which is funded by donations - is particularly striking in comparison to the military’s control over the state and its resources. The power gap between the Burmese military and the resistance (the PDF and EAOs combined) remains significant, in terms of not only size but also weaponry and firepower. However, for the time being, fighting the Burmese military remains the highest priority for all players.ĭespite the joint purpose among the resistance forces, it is unfortunate that the Burmese civil war is at a stalemate and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future. Myanmar’s resistance forces still have a long way to go in terms of political negotiation and reconciliation among themselves. The military government’s existence as a shared target and common threat is uniting the NUG, PDF, and EAOs under the same objectives, though not in terms of operations or future post-conflict objectives. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the leading ethnic armed organization in the Kachin state, and local PDFs have launched joint attacks against the military in Kachin State and Sagaing Region. Many of the PDF units cooperate or coordinate their positions with the EAOs. A sizeable portion of the PDF is either recognized by or under the command of the NUG. At the local level, especially in rural areas where the military junta’s control is weak, the PDF enjoys substantial control of the territory and has been launching attacks against military barracks, police stations, and government administrative offices.Īlthough the resistance is still fragmented, it somewhat improved in 2022. Even though different militias and units under the PDF framework do not share the same commander or commanding structure, they share the common aspiration of driving the military out of power. By 2022, the PDF was estimated to have expanded to more than 250 units with more than 65,000 troops. It is these conditions that have allowed the National Unity Government (NUG) - the shadow civilian government formed by members of the parliament elected during the 2020 general elections - and its armed wing, the People’s Defense Force (PDF), to thrive throughout the country. The opposition to the coup and the rejection of military rule have been the most powerful factors uniting the rest of the country and, crucially, driving divergent resistance forces together. They simply refuse to return to more decades of military rule, no matter that the Burmese military sees military rule as its natural prerogative and a normal state for the country. Before the coup, the Burmese people had tasted democracy and freedom and had been exposed to the outside world and the free flow of ideas, information, people, and economic opportunities under a democratic government. However, the modality of Burmese politics after the 2021 coup has been entirely different. And the landslide victory by Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) in the 1990 elections was also denied by the military, which held onto power for another 25 years until the NLD won again in the 2015 general elections. The 1962 coup led by General Ne Win replaced the country’s representative democracy with 26 years of military rule. The country is no stranger to military coups either. The fighting between the central government dominated by the Bamar majority and the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in seven ethnic states has never completely ceased since the country’s independence decades before the 2021 coup. Strictly speaking, the civil war in Myanmar has been ongoing since 1948. Nonresident Fellow - Foreign Policy, John L. Nonresident Fellow - Global Economy and Development, Africa Growth Initiative ![]()
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